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This booklet covering the last six months of our participation 
in World War II, tho of necessity brief, should bring to each one of 
you an enduring glow of pride in your individual accomplishments 
and the magnificent combat record of our Division. Gathering con-
fidence with experience, our Division wrote a brilliant chapter for 
itself and for our Army in the Ardennes counter-offensive of Decem-
ber 1944 when, in spite of many handicaps, it stopped the northern 
prong of Von Rundstedt's drive and held like a rock at the Elsenqorn 
shoulder. Thereafter your battle-field t echnique, dash and gallantry 
made you unbeatable and you recorded an unending string of brilliant 
victories - on the Roer, the Rhine, the Weser, Leipzig and Pilzen. 
You have earned for your Division five battle streamers, the eternal 
gratitude of your country and a justifiable pride in our own "Second 
to None." 
Along th3 way we have left many of our brave comrades. As 
we g lory in our fina l victories let us pause and render full tribute 
to their sacrifices. In humility, let us together salute them and 
dedicate our record of victories as recorded here, to their undying 
honor. 
M ajor General, Commanding 
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INTRODUCTION 
. 
This booklet is designed to give a general picture of the Second 
Infantry Division in its operations from the time it reached the 
Siegfried Line in Germany on October 4, 1944, until it arrived in 
Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, its location on V-E Day,. May 8, 1945. 
A preceding booklet told how the Second, which was activated in 
France in 1917 and :which probably gained more renown in World 
War I than any other division, opened its campaign in World War II 
when it came ashore on Omaha Beach in France, D plus 1, June 7. The 
story described the manner in which the wearers of the Indianhead 
patch fought their way through Treviers, Cerisy La Foret, and then, 
in one mighty effort, crushed the powerful Nazi defenses on Hill 192, 
grassy slope holding up the advance on St. Lo. 
In the speedy breakthrough South that followed, the Second 
stepped out in front and pushed through St. Jean des Baisants, Vire, 
and Tinchebray in victorious but hard fighting. It was next ordered 
along with two other divisions to take Brest, heavily defended sea-
port which the Germans had used as a submarine base. After a 
bitter four-week struggle, in which the Nazis fought desperately to 
prevent the port from passing into U. S. hands, the garrison formally 
surrendered to Major General Walter M. Robertson, Division Com-
mander, from Nelson County, Virginia, on September 18, 1944. 
The division then moved by truck and train across France and 
Belgium to the Siegfried Line, where this story begins. 
PRELUDE 
"What the Second Infantry Division has done in the past four 
days will live forever in the history of the United States Army." 
-LT. GEN. COURTNEY H. HODGES. 
These were the words that the First Army's commander wired 
softspoken Maj. Gen. Walter M. Robertson, after Nazi Panzer Divisions 
tried unsuccessfully to crack the Second's line during the German 
winter breakthrough. And these were the words that perhaps better 
described the Second's part in repelling the attack than any written 
during the period. 
It was the Second that held a shoulder of the bulge and for three 
days and nights beat back blow after blow by numerically superior 
forces seeking to cut through and seize the important road net extend-
ing to the North and Northeast. It was a stand made under con-
ditions military textbooks would describe as impossible, but the 
Second met the onslaught head-on and smashed back with such fury 
that two enemy divisions were badly mauled and a third forced to take 
another route of advance. 
Maj. Gen. C. R. Huebner, commander of the First Army's V Corps, 
said the part of the Second in protecting "the critical Eupen-Malmedy 
road cannot be praised too highly." Field Marshall Montgomery also 
singled out the Indianhead Division for praise. 
More than 100 armored vehicles were knocked out by the division 
and two members of the Second were awarded the Congressional Medal 
of Honor for braVf~::ry during this period. 
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CHAPTER I 
Lull Before the Storm 
The Second Division entered Germany on October 4. It crossed 
the border in the Schnee-Eiffel, ten miles East of St. Vith, Belgium, 
and as its first mission on German soil, took over the defense of a 
27-mile sector along the Siegfried Line. This was a sector, supposedly 
held by the enemy in light force, through which Von Runstedt's armies 
were to strike in the great December counter-offensive, launched five 
days after the Second had moved to another sector on December 11. 
In the 68 days between October 4 and December 11, the Second 
waged incessant patrol and artillery warfare with German troops in 
the deep pine forests and ridges of the Schnee-Eiffel. By day and night 
reconnaissance patrols roamed the forests seeking out enemy posi-
tions Ambush scouts pounced on unwary Germans. Combat groups 
jabbed enemy lines and battled enemy patrols in a mine-strewn no-
man's-land. At night, German patrols made raids through gaps in 
the lines that existed in the wide sector. In Schlausenbach, where 
the 9th Infantry CP was situated, the bell in the steeple of a tiny 17th 
Century Church was used as an "invasion bell" to warn Headquarters 
personnel of the approach of infiltrating patrols. On at least one 
occasion its toll brought men rushing out into the flickering glare of 
flares to defend the CP. 
Because of the lengthy front line, certain strong points were 
selected for defensive purposes. The Second Engineer Battalion 
quickly constructed Tobruk-type bunkers in these areas. Protected by 
wire and mines, they could hold a platoon and be defended against 
attacks from any direction. Weeks later, when the 106th Division 
occupied this area, Von Rundstedt's counter-offensive hit the thinly-
held line with terrific force, but it was several days before he was able 
to break through the strong defenses that had peen constructed. 
For weeks buzz bombs roared over Second Division lines on rush-
hour schedule, but damage and casualties were not high. 
In November, snows came, and the scene along the front might 
have been borrowed from a painting of the winter at Valley Forge. 
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Do-nut Dugout. 
Small groups of sol-
diers huddled around 
fires that could be 
built by day, and 
guards stood their 
posts in snow several 
inches deep. The for-
ests rang to the sound 
of axes, as the troops 
felled thousand,s of 
trees for shelters. The 
Division proved rich in 
log cabin architects. 
Despite the weather, most of the men lived comfortably. One company 
built a day room and furnished it with decorations a patrol had seized 
in a German hunting lodge in front of our lines. A Ranger Platoon, 
between skirmishes with Ger:mian patrols, lived in consummate comfort 
in a cabin fitted out with curtains, window panes, a hand-painted 
lamp, rug, tables, chairs, bunks, and even a doorbell- a bicycle bell 
affixed above the entrance. The 38th Infantry built a log chapel on the 
Siegfried Line. The big game hunters at the front shot deer in the 
forest and treated their platoons to venison steaks. 
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower visited the Second 
Division on November 8, and presented Silver Star awards at a 
ceremony at the forward CP in St. Vith. 
A few weeks later, on November 25, the 23rd Regiment held 
what was believed to be the first regimental parade on German soil 
in World War II. Gen-
eral Robertson deco'-
rated a number of men 
in the ceremony at 
Hemmers. 
On November 11 the 
D i v i s i o n observed 
Armistice Day with a 
barrage of small arms, 
mortar, and artillery 
fire at 11:00 a.m. The 
Digging in for the Winter. 
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Germans, after recovering from their surprise, made a feeble retalia-
tion. Thanksgiving was observed with a barrage of turkey- which 
was not fired at the Germans. The men looked forward to spending 
Christmas amid their pine-log luxury, but this was not to be the case. 
On December 10, in the midst of a driving snow storm, the 
Division started North for an attack on a Siegfried Line stronghold 
at Wehlerscheid in the Monschau Forest. The 106th Infantry Division 
assumed the defense of the Schnee-Eiffel, and, as the men of the 
Second pulled away, there were mutterings about the luck of the 106th 
Division inheriting such a quiet sector. But five days later, Von 
Runstedt's cyclone struck the 106th in full force, inflicting grievous 
casualties. The Second had missed Von Runstedt by five days in the 
Schnee-Eiffel, but it was to meet him head-on on the sixth. 
* 
CHAPTER II 
Heartbreak Crossroad 
To most men of the Second, the Wehler scheid Offensive became 
known as the battle of Heartbreak Crossroad- and with good reason. 
It was a savage, costly four-day battle in freezing weather, which 
erid.ed with the fruits of victory being snatched away under circum-
stances utterly- beyond the control of the men who fought there. 
The battle of Heartbreak Crossroad was a battle for the Roer 
River dams. The Second had the mission of capturing the dams if 
possible, or to force the enemy to blow the dams and eliminate the 
threat of the floodwaters 
wrecking the river crossings 
planned along the river. From 
Gemund, the river ran North 
several hundred miles and was 
a dangerous threat to the 
Allied advance as long as the 
enemy controlled the dams. 
The division's mission was an 
important one. 
Roads into Germany had 
proved to be scarce and heavi-
ly defended. There was only 
one good one leading to the 
dams in the division's zone. 
Heartbreak Crossroad. 
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This ran from Rocherath, Belgium, across the German border 
at Wehlerscheid - Heartbreak Crossroad - and thence beyond the 
Siegfried Line where it branched into an excellent road net. Along 
the German border the Rocherath road passed through the Monschau 
Forest, and at Wehlerscheid, in the heart of the forest, Siegfried 
Line fortifications were clamped across it like a giant vise. Barring 
the way into Germany were 25 concrete pillboxes squatting in the 
forest on both sides of the road.. For 200 yards the approach to the 
pillboxes had been cleared of trees to give German gunners a field of 
fire, and across the clearing, with its profusion of mines, stretched 
masses of barbed wire. 
A severe ordeal obviously awaited any troops attempting to force 
their way into Germany over this route. Yet as the war developed 
in early December, the road, as a means of approach toward the Roer 
River Dams, became more and more important in relation to the 
overall Allied strategy on the Western Front, and the Second Division 
was given the mission of smashing through the Wehlerscheid strong-
hold into the open country South of the dams. 
Spearheaded by the 9th Infantry, the division launched its attack 
on December 13, driving into the Monschau Forest astride the . 
Rocherath-Wehlerscheid road. Hardships beset the troops from the 
start. Snow, knee-deep in places, covered the ground and made the 
going laboriously hard for doughboys burdened with weapons, am-
munition, and packs. The forest was so dense the branches were 
interlocked as stiffly as gates, and the men had literally to push their 
way forward. To make matters more miserable a thaw was sending 
the snow on the pines dripping down on the men, soaking them to the 
skin. That night the weather turned intensely cold. They had to 
sleep without blankets, and their wet clothing froze. 
The attack was not preceded by an artillery preparation. It had 
been planned to surprise the enemy, and the regiment advanced 
several hundred yards to the vicinity of the clearing around the 
~ .. 'f· 
~4 
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pillboxes without oppo-
sition. As the assault 
companies neared the 
c l e a r i n g, however, 
leading scouts reported 
smoke from e n e m y 
fires. D o u g h b o y s 
dropped t h e i r over-
coats, gripped their 
weapons, and forged 
ahead across an anti-
tank ditch to the edge 
of the clearing. 
88's pay us a visit. 
Two hundred yards away, beyond the rows of barbed wire, were 
the pillboxes, squat, ugly, half-concealed in scrub pine. As the troops 
closed up to the clearing, hundreds of German guns of many caliber 
split the silence of the forest. And they exhaled murderous fire. The 
attack had been detected when the men crossed the anti-tank ditch. 
Machine guns clipped the bushes, kicking up dirt around the embattled 
doughboys. Artillery and mortar shells, shearing off the tops of 
trees, sprayed shrapnel in all directions. Casualties were heavy, the 
toll early in the engagement including the Second Battalion Operations 
Officer, the Battalion Commander's radio operator, the Company 
Commander of Company G, and the Executive Officer of Company E . 
• 
Soon after the fire fight had begun a patrol from Company E 
wriggled out into the clearing for more than 80 yards t o reach a 
slight elevation before the barbed wire barrier. There the men were 
stopped by heavy machine gun fire. It was quickly discovered, how-
ever, that from this rise in ground a much better view of the pillboxes 
could be obtained than from the edge of the clearing. Word was 
sent back to the lines. Artillery was notified. Accompanied by two 
radio operators, Capt. Homer G. Ross, of Elyria, Ohio, Company 
Commander of Company E , crawled out in the face of enemy guns 
to join the platoon. From the middle of t he clearing, he directed 
artillery fire by radio and succeeded in calling down direct hits on 
pillboxes. The patrol, however, could not breach the barbed wire, and, 
after the artillery mission had been fired, withdrew. 
Meanwhile to the South a remarkable piece of patrol work was 
being accomplished- one that was to prove again that the stoutest 
iron-and-steel defenses are vulnerable to the courage and tenacity 
of a few men. For in the midst of the raging battle 15 men under 
Tj Sgt. Clyde A. Dugan, of Canton, Ohio, and Sj Sgt. J ames R. Dunn, 
of Mosca, Colo., crawled through the crossfire of machine guns and 
the bursts of mortars, cutting the barbed wire and opening a path 
that was to lead the two battalions across the clearing and topple 
the entire German position. 
Soon after the regi-
ment had reached the 
clearing, Sgt. Dugan 
and nine of his men 
from the Third Pla-
toon of Company G 
started out on thei r 
stomachs through the 
barbed wire. Machine 
gun bullets crackled 
overhead. One m a n 
was killed, but ther e 
was no turning back. 
Through the Monschau 
Forest. 
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Yard by yard they toiled across the field through the snow until 
they reached the far end where they slid into a zigzag commu-
nicating trench linking tw.o pillboxes. At about the same time that 
Sgt. Dugan's patrol reached the trench, five men of the First Platoon 
of Company G, under Sgt. Dunn, were sent out in support. Two of 
them were wounded at the outset and fell back. The others continued 
on, with Sgt. Dunn and Sj Sgt. Adam C. Rivera, of Mesa, Arizona, 
cutting the barbed wire as they went. By the time they reached 
Sgt. Dugan, they had opened a four-foot gap in the wire across the 
field. 
No sooner had the t'Wo groups joined forces in the trench, how-
ever, than the Germans began frenzied attempts to destroy them. 
First came a patrol from the pillbox on the right. Bullets whizzed 
through the trench. The Americans captured one of th~ Germans 
and drove the others back. The captured German insisted that if he 
were allowed to return, he could persuade the others to _surrender. 
Sgt. Dugan gambled on it and let him go. A little while later there 
were sounds of movement, and it began to look as if the gamble had 
succeeded. Then a German machine gun muzzle poked slowly out from 
behind one of the turns in the trench. When a helmeted head followed 
it, no one was willing to gamble further. Sgt. Dugan shot the German 
gunner, then leaped out of the trench and fired into the_ rest of the 
Germans, killing another man. From the woods came another patrol, 
then another and another. For almost five hours Sgt. Dugan and his 
men stood off repeated attacks until they were able, under the cover 
of darkness, to slip back across the clearing to their lines. 
For the next 48 hours Second Division Artillery pounded the 
pillboxes, and patrols from the three battalions of the Ninth fought 
bloody skirmishes to dislodge the Germans. 
Then, after dark on December 15, Sgt. Dunn and an 11-man 
patrol from Company G crept out through the breach in the barbed 
wire and made their way toward the enemy lines with a sound-
powered telephone. An hour passed, then two hours. At last, at 
9 :30 p.m. a call came. "The Germans don't seem to be alert," Sgt. 
Dunn said in a low voice. "We have surrounded one of the pillboxes. 
No opposition." 
Lt. Col. Walter M. Higgins, Jr., of Chattanooga, Tenn., Second 
Battalion Commander, flashed the word back to the Regimental CP. 
A plan of attack was quickly formulated. Company F was sent through 
the gap in the barbed wire, making the path with white tape, and 
Company E followed. The two companies built up a bridgehead. The 
Third Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. William F. Kernan, San 
Antonio, Texas, was rushed through. The Germans woke up to what 
was happening, but too late. Their position was lost in a blazing 
attack. 
Pillbox doors were blasted open with beehive charges and 
bazookas, but sufficient dynamite was not on hand to blow up the 
pillboxes themselves. A charge of 1,500 pounds would have been 
required for each, and engineers were so busy building and clearing 
roads that they were unable to bring up the amount needed to destroy 
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the 24 pillboxes in the area. This did not seem important at the time, 
but it was soon to be a cause of bitter disappointment. In the desperate 
struggle lying ahead, these pillboxes were to pass once again into 
German hands and have to be retaken. 
Some of the defenders tried to escape and were killed, many 
surrendered. Company L, commanded by First Lt. Melvin S. Goldstein, 
of Brooklyn, N.Y., seized a fortified customs house with 77 prisoners. 
With the German lines breached, General Robertson acted swiftly 
to exploit the advantage. On tQ.e morning of December 16 the 38th 
Infantry passed through the 9th to attack towards its objective, 
Dreiborn, Germany. During the day the 38th pushed on: 1,500 yards 
against resistance that was sometimes very stubborn. · 
Bright prospects were opening to the Second Division. The first 
belt of the Siegfried Line had been breached at Wehlerscheid. The 
road to Hofen and Monschau and the road to Dreiborn and Schleiden 
were ready to fall like ripe plums. It was a moment of well deserved 
triumph, but there were somber and ominous overtones, a feeling 
that all was not well. German artillery was growing in volume along 
the line. 
At 10:00 p.m., the telephone rang in the CP of the First Battalion 
9th Infantry. Major William F. Hancock, of Ruby, South Carolina, 
Battalion Executive Officer, answered it. Lt. Col. Ralph V. Steele, 
of Lake Norden, South Dakota, then Regimental Executive Officer, 
was calling. His message was not reassuring. There was trouble to 
the South; the battalion might have to withdraw in the morning. 
The news was scarcely credible. During the night the Germans threw 
in sharp counter-attacks around Wehlerscheid. 
In the morning battalion commanders were hurriedly summoned 
to Regiment. There the full truth became known. A serious German 
counter-attack was developing around Rocherath. The 9th and 38th 
Regiments must pull back quickly to avoid encirclement and help 
stem the attack. The pillboxes so dearly won must be relinquished 
without a fight. 
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The word spread among the troops: "We're pulling back." In 
the distance was a heavy rumble of artillery. Dog fights raged over·-
head, and the forest was filled with the diri of anti-aircraft fire. In 
this tense atmosphere the 2nd Division broke contact with the enemy 
and gave up .Heartbreak Crossroad. Many days were to pass before 
it returned. 
* 
CHAPTER III 
No Breakthrough Here 
Shadows of the threat from Rundstedt's armor and infantry had 
been first cast early on the morning of December 16th when, after 
an artillery free period, heavy concentrations of enemy shells rained 
on the divisional sector, continuing through the afternoon and night. 
On the afternoon of December 16th threatening shadows assumed 
a darker and more menacing appearance when General Robertson 
received orders not to commit the 23rd Regiment, which at that time 
was preparing to move from Camp Elsenborn, site of the Division 
rear echelon, to aid in the exploitation of the Wehlerscheid break-
through. Later in the afternoon one battalion of the 23rd was de-
tached from Division control and attached to the 99th Division to 
plug gaps in the lines. Shortly afterwards another battalion was . 
attached to the 99th, leaving only one battalion of the 23rd in 
Division reserve. 
Later in the day Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, deputy com-
mander of .V Corps, and General Robertson held a discussion and 
proposed operations indicated a change in plans. The threat to the 
division now had become a definite conclusion. 
It was hardly 7:30 a.m. on December 17th when General Robert-
son learned from the V Corps Commander that the enemy was attack-
ing in force along the entire front of other divisions and had already 
broken through defenses of a neighboring division on the right and 
rear, thereby seriously threatening the 2nd Division flank and Com-
mand Post at Wirtzfeld. 
The impending storm had struck in fury. The size and proportion 
of this gigantic enemy attack was the first indication that the Ger-
man's winter offensive in the Ardennes had been launched. The 2nd 
Division, with two of its regiments miles ahead pressing an attack 
of their own, was in a precarious position. To prevent the two 
regiments from being completely cut off from the remainder of the 
Division, rear echelon and special units must assume the responsibility 
of holding the surging tide when it struck until the 9th and 38th could 
pull back and establish a defense in Rocherath and Krinkelt. 
Almost immediately after word was received that the neighboring 
division had been overrun by superior forces of German tanks and 
foot troops, the 9th and 38th began disengaging from the enemy and 
started a daylight withdrawal from the Wehlerscheid area to defensive 
positions around Rocherath, Krinkelt, and Wirtzfeld, covering the 
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roads leading to Eupen and Verviers. The · remammg battalion of 
the 23rd, plus a TD Company and a company of medium tanks, started 
South at once toward Rocherath, Krinkelt, and Wirtzfeld, the latter 
the site of the Division Command Post. 
In the next 14 hours, the Indianhead Division, achieved what 
military books say is impossible. Against two powerful German 
divisions it did a complete turnabout from the offensive to a well 
organized daylight withdrawal and defense against a threat from 
the flank and rear, then slammed the door in Rundstedt's face. 
Uncertainty of the situation on December 16th had resulted in 
General Robertson, who years before had become an expert on day-
light withdrawals, mapping a plan for drawing back which was 
immediately put into effect. Col. Chester J. Hirschfelder, San Antonio, 
Texas, commanding the 9th Regiment, was placed in charge of the 
disengagement and withdrawal, and Col. P. D. Ginder of San Diego, 
Calif., spare combat team commander at that time, gathered all 
available men to coordinate defenses Southwest of Wirtzfeld where 
the Division CP was threatened. 
Meanwhile Col. John H. Stokes, Assistant Division Commander 
from Freehold, New Jersey, was put in charge of all troops in the 
Rocherath and Krinkelt area, and Division Headquarters was alerted 
to prepare for defense of the CP now in imminent danger of being 
overrun. German tanks and infantry were already pouring through 
disrupted lines of another division into Bullingen, two miles from 
Wirtzfeld, where the Second Engineer Company, Second Signal Com-
pany, and Second Quartermaster Company were located. 
When the first contingent of enemy tanks and infantrymen· 
lunged into Bullingen, one group of engineers held them off until the 
majority of their force could be evacuated. They later made their way 
to a battalion of riflemen and joined in a counterattack on a German 
held town. Some of the engineers managed to infiltrate out, but one 
group went into cellars and took up the battle. They were ordered 
out two days later after artillery fire from both sides made the area 
a no-man's land. Twelve members of the Second Signal Company's 
supply and repair section concealed themselves in a cellar and when 
Nazis occupied the upper floors were forced to strangle their pet dog 
"Tuffy" to prevent being discovered. Later, they managed to get 
out under cover of darkness. Like the signalmen, the Second Quarter-
master Company suffered a severe blow, losing all its supplies and 
managing to get out only a few trucks when the quick panzer thrust 
hit the town. Some of the men took off across the fields and plowed 
through the deep snow to safety. Trapped in a house, nine others 
hid inside a creamery vault and watched German tankmen loot U. S. 
clothing and supplies. That night they crept out and got back to 
American lines. 
Overpowering small division forces in Bullingen, hostile armor 
and infantry from the crack 1st SS Panzer Division swept on toward 
Wirtzfeld where Division Headquarters personnel rallied to stem the 
attack until the arrival of infantrymen from the 23rd. When enemy 
tanks appeared on the skyline hardly 600 yards from the Division CP 
and opened fire on Wirtzfeld, General Robertson bluntly said: "We 
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are going to hold this CP." Then the brilliant Virginia tactician, 
part of Division Headquarters defense platoon, cooks, orderlies and 
clerks, proceeded to do just that against both tanks and troops. 
General Robertson himself helped direct traffic despite enemy tank 
and artillery fire, and supervised the placing of anti-tank defenses. 
Two enemy tanks and an armored car were knocked out in the first 
five minutes of the battle. 
Only one road leading from Wirtzfeld to. Elsenborn could now be 
used by the division, and this was a muddy, one-way route so bad in 
spots that often jeeps had to be winched through. Foresighted en-
gineers, who knew that in the event the main road was cut an escape 
route would have to be available, had plotted it and worked over the 
worst spots prior to the breakthrough. Now the entire burden of 
maintaining the flow of traffic fell on the Division's MP's. Artillery 
and long-range small arms fire was falling constantly, but they re-
mained at the posts, helping push stalled vehicles off the road and 
hurrying others through. It was only after all vehicles and infantry 
•had moved back and the covering force from the 7 41st Tank Battalion 
was ready to pull out, that the MP's withdrew. 
While the first enemy thrust at the Division was being repulsed 
at Wirtzfeld, and the 9th and 38th regiments were redeploying into 
Rocherath, General Robertson learned that the enemy had broken 
through another defense line Northeast of Rocherath and threatened 
to roll into the town before stabilized defenses could be established. 
Meanwhile, the First Battalion of the 9th, commanded by Lt. Col. 
William D. McKinley, San Antonio, Texas, had reluctantly abandoned 
the 24 steel and concrete pillboxes taken after such bitter fighting, 
and was pulling back to the original jumping-off place to safeguard 
the East flank of the Division. It was General Robertson, who, in this 
emergency was in the field directing his fighting units, that inter-
cepted Company K and the First Battalion of the 9th and led it into 
defensive positions along a vital road junction. Orders were to hold 
the road at all costs. German armor which had broken through on 
the Northeast was expected to use this road network into Rocherath 
and the junction must be held if remaining units of the 9th and 38th 
were to successfully reach Rocherath. 
At 5 P. M. on December 17th word came down that a reinforced 
enemy armored column had worked its way into Rocherath and was 
being opposed by the 38th's First and Second Battalions. The two 
units had been spearheading the Division attack, but had been ordered 
to fall back into Rocherath when initial German thrusts resulted in 
the Second Division's flanks being exposed. 
Commanded by Lt. Col. Jack K. Norris of Payette, Idaho, the 
Second Battalion reached the town before the main column struck and 
immediately began opposing 12 enemy tanks attempting to overrun 
the sector. The First Battalion, led by Lt. Col. Frank T. Mildren of 
Los Vegas, Nevada, was caught in route column before arriving, how-
ever, and suffered heavy casualties in battling tanks and foot troops. 
The two battalions brought much-needed help to the 38th's 
Service Company which already had engaged an enemy task force that 
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also had struck at Bullingen and Wirtzfeld. Clerks, KPs, maintenance 
men, drivers and telephone operators had been organized into rifle 
squads and bazooka teams to halt thrusts on the edge of Rocherath. 
While the First and Second Battalions were engaged in stiff 
conflict in Rocherath, the 38th's Third Battalion under Lt. Col. Olinto 
M. Barsanti of Tonopah, Nevada, was undergoing artillery and tank 
fire near Krinkelt, where it had been sent from Regimental reserve to 
protect the main supply route. 
Throughout the day hundreds of disorganized troops from nearby 
units that had been overrun streamed back into the Second's lines in 
a frantic search for safety. Doughboys were given orders to hold their ' 
fire until they were able to ident~fy the advancing forces. At times, 
in the murky, foggy atmosphere, this endeavor to spare the lives of' 
friendly troops cost the lives of Second Division men behind the guns. 
Entire U. S. squads and platoons were wiped out when it was learned 
too late that the onrushing horde was German and not American. 
The degree to which this, combined with the unnerving appearance of 
friendly troops fleeing before the enemy, could have influenced the 
morale of doughboys less seasoned than the Second cannot be over-
emphasized. But the Second held its ground. The disorganized troops 
were sifted into the Division and aided in stopping the push. 
The night of December 17th was a nightmare for the 38th, com-
manded by Col. Francis H. Boos of Janesville, Wisconsin. There was 
no sleep for anyone. Both enemy and friendly troops occupied Krin-
kelt. The enemy armored column which had infiltrated unstable lines 
kept the regiment alerted throughout the night. Clashes between foot 
troops and friendly and enemy tanks were common during the hours 
of darkness. Communications between battalions were virtually im-
possible since artillery had severed all lines. It was not until noon of 
December 18th that the enemy finally was ejected from the town and 
contact again established with the units. Three of the enemy tanks 
had been destroyed within 200 yards of the Regimental Command 
Post. 
While the 38th was battling tanks and infantry in Krinkelt and 
Rocherath during the night of the 17th, the First Battalion of the 
9th, at their crossroad position, was hurling back intermittent German 
tank attacks. 
The Third Battalion of the 23rd absorbed one of Rundstedt's best 
Sunday punches in another sector on the night of December 17 when 
it repulsed eight enemy attacks. Later this battalion joined tlie Third 
Battalion of the 38th Regiment and continued to battle tanks and 
infantry for the remainder of the critical period. 
But it was the First Battalion of the 23rd, commanded by Lt. Col. 
John M. Hightower, Las Cruces, New Mexico, which bore the brunt 
of enemy assaults against this regiment and dealt inestimable punish-
ment to the enemy. Fighting desperately on three sides and their 
escape route slowly closing behind them, the battalion organized a 
nine-man patrol led by Sgt. Floyd R. Swartz, Detroit, Michigan, to 
find an outlet from the trap. Without communications since telephone 
wires had been shelled and their radios were not functioning, the lives 
of many men depended upon this patrol. Finding a suitable route 
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What price glory 
at Krinkelt 
partially obliterated by 
fallen snow, the tiny 
band made its way in 
darkness one and a 
half miles to Mur-
ringen, Belgium and 
then back to the bat-
talion. Within a few 
hours the last of the 
700 men had been 
guided to safety. 
Over in another sector, Col. Jay B. Lovless, of San Antonio, ·rexas, 
. commanding the 23rd Regiment, became commander of all troops in 
the Sourbrodt-Elsenborn area after his three battalions were split 
between commands of the Second Division and the 99th. He organized 
the "Lovless Task Force" which included a battalion of three rifle 
companies formed by Major Frank Hoke, Lebanon, Mo., Division 
Special Service Officer, from the rear echelon clerks, cooks, bandsmen, 
and drivers. This battalion was known as the "Hoke Battalion." The 
"Loveless Task Force" defended the area South of Elsenborn and pre-
pared defenses East of Berg, Belgium, to which the division riflemen 
could fall back when the time was ripe. 
Surveying the situation weeks later, General Robertson said that 
apparently the initial armored attack on the division was by a flank 
guard, which haVing hit solid resistance, shied away from Rocherath-
Krinkelt. This striking force, the 1st SS Panzer Division, had an 
objective and route further to the South and West in the direction of 
Malmedy. The 12th SS Panzer Division followed this later in the day 
and apparently had the mission of going through the Rocherath-
Krinkelt Elsenborn area. However, by this time, the Second had 
had time to organize its positions. Between these two attacks, there 
were abortive thrusts by the 277th Volksgrenadier Division, but these 
were handled without great difficulty. Had the attacks by the two 
panzer divisions been reversed and the Second hit hard in the morning 
before it had time to get set, General Robertson said he believed there 
would not have been sufficient strength to stop the blow. 
The full force of the German offensive hit the division from three 
sides on the morning of December 18th. One tremendous German 
attack was intercepted by Lt. Col. William D. McKinley and his first 
Battalion of the 9th, which staged a gallant fight to hold the important 
crossroads just outside of Rocherath. The onrushing tanks and in-
fantry were met with bazookas, cans of gasoline and phosphorous 
grenades while hasty mine fields helped to slow the progress of the 
enemy, later identified as the 12th SS Panzer Division. The Nazis 
threw masses of tanks and men at the 9th's sector and so severe was 
the battle for the crossroads that First Lt. Stephen E. Truppner, 
Baltimore, Maryland, whose company had been reduced to approxi-
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mately 50 men, called for artillery on his own position. The last words 
from the officer were, "Artillery is coming in fine." Only 12 men 
from this company escaped, but Lt. Truppner was not among them. 
Practically surrounded and warding off attackers on three sides, First 
Lt. Eugene Hinski, anti-tank platoon leader from Haddenfield, New 
Jersey, intercepted four tanks from the 7 41st Tank Battalion. They 
counterattacked and kept the enemy occupied while the battalion 
withdrew. Three German tanks were disabled in this action. Troops 
were hard pressed as they took the back door out of the rapidly 
closing pocket, and when Col. McKinley and his operations officer left 
the site, the enemy was near enough to shout "Hande Roche." This 
delaying action in front of Rocherath was a vivid example of the vital 
part a small unit can play in a great battle. When the first battalion 
of the 9th reached Elsenborn its ranks numbered only 217 out of a 
total battalion strength of 860 men. 
Repeated enemy attacks by enemy forces ranging from one 
platoon to several companies were thrown back by the division 
throughout the day. The 38th regiment fighting gallantly on the very 
edges of Rocherath and Krinkelt, waged a see-saw battle which be-
came so intense there was no semblance of a front line. At one time 
men from the First Battalion were completely cut off from supplies, 
but fought back with what they had from basements, attics, barns and 
dung heaps. The Anti-tank Company, led by Capt. James Love of 
Butte, Montana, had little rest during the melee as all men who could 
be spared from the guns fought up front as riflemen. In one enemy 
attack, anti-tank personnel and supporting artillery knocked out nine 
of 24 attacking tanks. Pvt. Isabel Salzar, Houston, Texas, a cook's 
helper, left his pots and pans long enough to knock out two German 
tanks with a bazooka and effect a road block for other German tanks. 
In one of the grimmest fights of the day, two platoons of Company C 
led by Edward C. Rollings, San Antonio, Texas, scattered a German 
attack spearheaded by 11 tanks. Fifty Germans were killed and 25 
Second Division men captured the night before were rescued. First 
Lt. Sidney B. Dane, Chicago, Illinois, rounded up a herd of cattle to 
use as a road block when enemy tanks threatened the command post 
of the 38th regiment's first battalion. Riflemen from Company F 
commanded by Capt. John Dumont, San Antonio, Texas, fought off 
three enemy tank and infantry attacks leaving an estimated 75 dead. 
Capt. Joseph Skaggs, LaCrosse, Wisconsin, established a defense 
around the Regimental CP, and his riflemen picked off infiltrating 
Nazis and tanks. His company was credited with disabling five of the 
78 tanks claimed to have been knocked out by the 38th combat team 
during the three-day period. 
It was in this jumbled battlefield around Rocherath that Tj Sgt. 
Frank (Hardtack) Kviateck, 47, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, ace 
sniper of the division and oldest enlisted man in the 38th regiment, 
was captured when his machine gun section was overrun. He had 36 
notches on his rifle at that time. 
Wire communications had remained in good shape and General 
Robertson later commented that he was able to get contact with the 
Division CP from various points in its sector almost at will. It had 
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been the custom for the Division Signal Company to always lay an 
alternate wire lirie. When the main line was cut along with the 
supply route from Elsenborn to Bullingen, Murringen and Wirtzfield, 
the emergency circuit, running along the only exit road then open, 
was used. 
General Robertson commenting on the particular action at 
Rocherath was inclined to believe that Lady Luck more than ever 
smiled on the Second Division. The 12th SS Panzer Division during 
the continued attacks it made for 36 hours never once diverted from 
its original plan but kept hitting the division head on. Yet for nearly 
three days, the flanks of the Second Division were exposed. 
On through the night of December 18th and through the day of 
December 19th the enemy attacks continued relentlessly. But the 
Division by this time. had established contact with all units, and were 
fighting an organized, but desperate defense. On the night of Decem-
ber 19th, the Division pulled out of Krinkelt and set up defenses on 
the Elsenborn Ridge. By the morning of December 20th it was a 
foregone conclusion that one section of Rundstedt's sweep toward 
Antwerp had been definitely halted after one of the hardest battles 
along the entire First Army front. 
The nation's highest soldier honor, the Congressional Medal of 
Honor, was later to be awarded two members of the Second for 
unusual acts of bravery during these desperate times. Pfc. Jose M. 
Lopez, 33-year-old Brownsville, Texas, machine gunner, killed more 
than 100 Germans and enabled his company to withdraw from an 
apparently hopeless trap. In the 23rd Regiment's M Company, he was 
attached to K Company when enemy troops began to break through 
the company's left flank on December 17. Grabbing his machine gun, 
he lugged it unassisted across the company front to get a field of fire 
and then set the weapon up in a shallow hole affording no· protection 
from the waist up. He immediately cut down 10 of the Nazis, and 
then, when an enemy tank approached, ignored its machine gun and 
88 )Tim gun fire coming at him, and killed 25 Germans following it. 
~ ' 
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Enemy foot troops had 
begun to penetrate the 
company's lines from 
the rear and so Lopez, 
still ignoring the tank 
fire, moved his gun 
back and halted wave 
after wave of advanc-
ing forces. His deadly 
fire had caused the 
Germans to concen-
trate on him, but he 
kept the gun blazing 
Tiger tank kayoed near 
Krinkelt. 
away. A round from the tank landed nearby and the concussion 
knocked him over backwards and blew the gun several feet aw~y, 
but he yanked it back and opened up again. When the company 
finally withdrew, he dropped back 100 yards to another defensive 
position and blasted away until his ammunition was exhausted 10 
minutes later. He then rejoined his company. 
The award also went to T/ 4 Truman Kimbro of Madisonville, 
Texas, member of Company C of the Second Engineer's Combat 
Battalion. But unlike Lopez, who lived to receive the honor, Kimbro 
paid his life on a muddy road near Rocherath, Belgium, on December 
17th. Kimbro was lead scout in a squad given the job of mining or 
blocking a highly important crossroad well ahead of U. S. front lines. 
On getting within sight of the intersection, he found it occupied by a 
German Tiger tank and 20 dug in infantrymen. Kimbro tried two 
other approaches to lead the men to a point where they could block 
the crossroads, but the Germans remained and the assignment ap-
peared an impossible one. Then, in full view of the tank and infantry, 
Kimbro crawled to a road leading to the crossroad and began to creep 
out to lay the mines. Heavy fire rained down and he was severely 
wounded, but he continued on and placed the mines across the road. 
On attempting to draw back to safety, however, the fire became even 
heavier and he was hit innumerable times. Machine gun bursts 
actually rolled his body. Officers said the mines were a definite 
factor in delaying enemy armor long enough to permit U. S. forces to 
successfully evacuate to Rocherath. They also helped keep the enemy 
from attacking the rear of Division forces moving back. 
During this border battle 2nd Division Artillery played its most 
important role. Massed artillery fire from the 38th, 37th, 12th and 
· 15th Field Artillery units, was used to its greatest advantage, resulting 
in staggering losses on the enemy and in great measure helping to 
stem the tide of the German thrust. When the enemy first struck 
the rear of the division, artillery battalions were supporting the in-
fantry attack from extreme forward positions. In order to give sup-
porting fire to the rear where the Division CP was being attacked, 
the 12th and 37th Battalions, upon orders from General John H. 
Hinds, of San Antonio, Texas, each turned one battery completely 
around and placed fire on enemy tanks and infantry within 800 yards 
of the CP, continuing at the same time to fire support to infantry 
attempting to disengage from their forward attack positions. When it 
was learned the Cub air field of the Division on the outskirts of 
Bullingen had been overrun, the 37th swept the field with 40-battery 
volleys, destroying all planes and denying the use of them to the enemy. 
The 38th FA fired over 5,000 rounds on December 18th which indi-
cates the tremendous volume of fire required to stem the attack. 
Members of the 12th and 15th FA Battalions made repeated trips to 
an abandoned ammunition dump near the enemy front lines while 
subjected to enemy rifle and machine gun fire and recovered several 
hundred rounds which permitted the battalions to maintain a con-
tinuous and devastating fire. 
The breakthrough tested the ability of virtually every unit in 
the division to function under the worst possible conditions. The 
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Second Medical Battalion had one of the hardest jobs of all. Its 
evacuation highway was cut shortly after the attack opened and only 
one other serviceable road to the front remained. This, of necessity, 
had to be used mainly to bring up ammunition and supplies. The 
medics had to plot their own evacuation route, tearing down fences 
and shoveling snow to get the ambulances through in some instances. 
Back roads, trails and even footpaths were utilized. Other medics were 
at the same time venturing beyond U. S. front lines to bring in 
wounded left behind as troops dropped back. Despite' intense fighting 
going on in the streets, they went out time and again to aid the fallen. 
Shells on several occasions blew down walls of the aid stations. So 
many wounded were brought in- 1,030 patients were admitted dur-
ing the December 17, 18, 19 period- that ambulance facilities were 
not sufficient and jeeps and trucks had to be commandeered and used 
without protection of Red Cross markings. 
A captured German major, asked why the German thrust was 
unsuccessful, replied, "We failed because our right flank near 
Monschau ran its head against a wall." The wall was built of men 
who had never known defeat and who would not bring themselves to 
admit it. The miracle was created by battle experience and superior 
command supervision, and the impossible was turned into victory by 
leadership and courage. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The Road Back 
After darkness on December 19th, the last elements of the 2nd 
Division had withdrawn and taken positions on the Elsenborn Ridge, 
dominating terrain feature overlooking the twin cities of Krinkelt 
and Rocherath which were being shelled heavily by American 
Artillery. 
The Division CP set up at Camp Elsenborn, where plans for 
reorganization and regrouping were formulated. Riflemen dug in, 
improved their underground homes by insulating them against cold and 
dampness with sides of ration boxes and pine boughs, and equipped 
them with makeshift stoves made from abandoned jerricans of Ger-
man milk cans. 
On the 20th of December the enemy felt out the defenses with 
several small attacks which were repulsed. Deciding that the sector 
was too strongly fortified and too firmly held, the Germans made no 
further efforts to continue their offensive. 
The enemy shelled the Division area with artillery and rockets. 
The Luftwaffe reappeared to bomb and strafe supply routes and 
elements of the di'vision at Camp Elsenborn. Buzz-bombs sputtered 
over the sector on almost constant schedules. It was a cold, white 
Christmas for the 2nd Division, but every one was busy with plans 
and preparations for future operations. Intermittent snows fell during 
the latter part of December and early January. 
The 38th Infal).try remained in line and in contact with the enemy 
throughout the Elsenborn Defense. The Regimental sector was sub-
mitted to heavy enemy shelling for several weeks, and twice the 
enemy scored direct hits on the kitchen of Regimental Headquarters. 
Scouting and patrolling became the vogue, and Capt. Edward L. 
Farrel, Jr., Boston; Massachusetts, carried off top honors ,when he led 
two patrols into no-man's-land and brought in a total of 17 German 
outpost guards with-
out firing a shot. 
Shortly afterwards 
three strong combat 
patrols cleaned out a 
section between Wirtz-
feld and Bullingen, 
taking 18 prisoners, 
killing 39 Nazis and 
wounding many 
others. 
On New Year's Day, 
11 hostile planes straf-
ed and bombed the 
Snowed in at Elsenborn. 
.-4 
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division area. Several were shot down by 462nd Anti-Aircraft Bat-
talion gunners, who 4ad been waging a hot fight against the aerial 
invaders, and the pilot of one plane was captured. 
On January lOth, Col. P. D. Ginder assumed command of the 9th 
Regiment. 
During the middle of the month Nebelwerfers appeared again on 
the Second Division front, and riflemen began picking up a number of 
enemy deserters who walked voluntarily into American Lines. 
On January 12, the 23rd Infantry Combat Team, consisting of the 
23rd Regiment, the 37th FA Battalion and one company each from 
the 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion, the 7 41st Tank Battalion, the 
Second Engineer Battalion, and the Second Medical Battalion, was 
organized and ordered to the Weismes-Robertville-Ovifat vicinity to 
prepare for an offensive in conjunction with the First Infantry 
Division. It was given as its final objective the Ondenval-Iveldinger 
Pass, which had to be taken in order that . the 7th Armored Division 
could pass through and recapture St. Vith. 
In the bitter fighting which the combat team engaged in from 
January 15-20, it gained five miles, took 373 prisoners, killed more 
than 500 and wounded a large number of enemy. Fighting was partic-
ularly bitter throughout the entire engagement and deep snow and 
severe cold made conditions miserable for troops. Numerous mines 
were encountered as well as heavy machine gun and artillery fire. 
But despite what it was up against, the team functioned so well it drew 
an official commendation for its work from the Corps Commander. 
The heroic struggle of G Company, which won many laurels for 
its battling in hip deep snow and a blizzard, is a good example of the 
soldiering that was carried on at a time when all hope of an early . 
victory over Germany seemed blighted. Commanded by Capt. John H. 
Stephens of Tyler, Texas, the company which entered the action with 
· only 100 men, was credited with capturing 150 enemy and killing 100 
in four days of bitter strife. 
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To overcome one obstacle, a crossroads with a cluster of houses, 
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the officer had artil-
lery and tank guns 
force the Nazi defend-
ers into cellars. Then 
in a quick maneuver, 
the first was lifted arid 
two "G" Company 
platoons swept 400 
yards to successfully 
storm the position. 
Another time, the cap-
tain ran into a machine 
gun nest, but found his 
Hotel Foxhole, 
welcome. 
visitors 

pistol holster so packed with snow from crawling that he co~ldn't get 
the weapon out. Thinking quickly, he grabbed a radio and t)lreatened 
to throw it. The bluff worked and the enemy machine gun crew of 
two men surrendered, evidently believing the officer was about to 
attack them with a secret weapon. 
Three days of fighting in sub freezing temperatures with only 
an occasional K ration to eat reduced the company's strength to 70 
men, but it kept on. In the tiny town of Eibertingen, it ran into some of 
its toughest street fighting since Brest, with opposing forces firing 
at 12-yard range and exchanging grenades within houses. After the 
company killed 50 enemy and took 41 prisoners in the town, the 
Germans withdrew and began to organize for a counter-attack. It 
never got started, however. Artillery. and a firing line of BAR's and 
rifles quickly met the challenge and 160 German dead were counted 
when the Americans halted their fire. 
On January 30th, the 38th Infantry jumped off in a drive through 
deep snow drifts and bitter cold to retake the three towns of Wirtzfeld, 
Krinkelt, and Rocherath where it had successfully blocked ·Rundstedt's 
December drive. The Ninth Regiment pushed off at the same time 
with orders to pass through the First Division, make a limited ob-
jective attack and then go through the 38th after Wirtzfeld, Krinkelt 
and Rocherath were captured. It was then to continue -into the 
Wehlerscheid area which it had previously taken in December. Chief 
obstacles were terrain and weather, with snow and forested country 
making progress slow and fatiguing. But the division was in a vengeful 
mood and anxious to return_ to the border towns which by now had 
been reduced to shambles by intense allied bombing and shelling. 
The Second Battalion of the 38th Infantry took Wirtzfeld with-
out resistance, finding the town and its approaches heavily mined. 
Lt. Col. Jack K. Norris, Battalion Commander stepped into a building 
to look at his map and he and his forward elements captured six 
Germans hiding in the cellar. 
From here the First and Third Battalions pushed on into Krinkelt 
and Rocherath where enemy delaying action resulted in stubborn and 
fierce house to house fighting before resistance was overcome. Led 
22 
Ack ack on the Alert. 
by First Lt. Albert 
Shelton, Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma, one 
platoon from Company 
K, 38th Infantry, 
spearheaded the attack 
into Krinkelt. They 
had been the last men 
to leave in December 
and were the first to 
reenter the shell-splin-
tered town. First Lt. 
JohnS. Calhoun, Jack-
sonville, Florida, assumed command of the company when the com-
manding officer fell mortally wounded, and retook his old CP along 
with 15 German prisoners. While the Third Battalion was mopping up 
Krinkelt, the First cleaned out points of scattered resistance in 
Rocherath. 
On January 31, the Third Battalion of the 9th Infantry, mounted 
on tanks, moved toward Wehlerscheid and "Heartbreak Crossroads," 
while the Second Battalion of the 23rd Infantry, attacked along the 
road leading to Hellenthal, gateway to the second line of Siegfried 
defenses. The terrain was so rugged and the roads so blocked with 
snow and ice, that tanks, towing trailers, were used to carry supplies 
and ammunition, and to evacuate the wounded. Weasels, the "Jeeps 
with tracks," which had been used by the Division in winter maneuvers 
in Michigan during the pre-invasion days, were again p~t in use. 
February found the division driving back into Germany. On 
February 3, 48 days after the withdrawal from Heartbreak Cross-
roads, the 9th Infantry returned. This time it was different. The 
9th Infantry Division, advancing from the North, had out-flanked 
Wehlerscheid and the Germans, instead of putting up the desperate 
resistance they had offered in December, cowered in the pillboxes 
awaiting capture. As men of the 9th Regiment trudged past the old 
battle-ground on the way to new ones, they paid silent tribute to the 
comrades who fell there and to the four grim days and nights at 
Heartbreak Crossroad. 
Once beyond Wehlerscheid, the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry, 
with Company F mounted on tanks, stormed into the German towns 
of Harperscheid and Schoneseiffen, capturing 250 prisoners and 
knocking out a tank and self-propelled gun. Entering Harperscheid, 
Pvt. Joseph A. Atkinson, Large, Pennsylvania, who had joined the 
company only two weeks before, knocked out a self-propelled gun with 
a rifle grenade. When a tank moved up to tow it away, S/ Sgt. Vladis 
Lucan, Innis, Texas, rapped on the side with his rifle and demanded 
that the crew surrender. The crew surrendered. Company E, 9th 
Infantry, had hardly set up its CP in Harperscheid when a German 
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Kings of the Hit hway at 
Harperscheid. 
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corporal opened the 
door and walked in, 
surprised to find the 
Americans there. 
When the 23rd In-
fantry was held up by 
an enemy machine 
gun, Pfc. John M. 
Packard, Grande, 
Oregon, dashed across 
an open field and wiped 
out the crew with 
several bursts from a 
tommy gun. On February 3rd the First Battalion of the 23rd Infantry 
cleared the town of Bronsfeld, and the 9th Infantry captured 
Ettelscheid and Berescheid. 
* 
CHAPTER V 
Pillboxes Behind 
One of the thorns in the general push forward was a group of 
pillboxes located to the front of Hellenthal which had defied repeated 
attempts by XVIII Corps troops to break through and seize the town. 
Situated in a narrow valley, Hellenthal had terrain features ideal for 
its protection. The entire area was to the right and out of the Second's 
sector, but when its troops began to receive fire from this vicinity, the 
Division found it necessary to clean out the town and surrounding 
high ground. By doing so, it put troops to the rear of the pillboxes 
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Crossing the Roer at 
Heimbach. 
and the Germans hastily aban-
doned them without a fight and 
fled. The obstacle in the path of 
XVIII Corps' advance was thus 
removed. 
The battle for the city was a 
tough one, however. The enemy 
had good observation on the 
narrow, winding roads leading 
into the valley, which made it 
difficult for U.S. troops to bring 
in supplies or to reinforce the 
infantry attack with vehicles or armor without the enemy bringing 
down heavy concentrations of artillery or mortar fire on the roads. 
The Nazis had also blown the only bridge across the Olef River. 
thus preventing the employment of armor into the small village until a 
bridge could be constructed. 
The Second and Third Battalions of the 38th Infantry jumped 
off early in the morning and succeeded in reaching the outskirts of 
the town without arousing the garrison. The Third Battalion pushed 
across the river by wading and swimming in the icy waters and by 
evening had secured the Western edge of the town against heavy 
resistance. The Second Battalion seized the high ground Northeast 
of the town, but when it .tried to take the Southwest edge, the enemy 
fought bitterly. By the next morning, however, Hellenthal was in 
U.S. hands. 
Meanwhile the First Battalion, 9th Infantry, launched an attack 
to take Scheurn and the high ground to the West. This was accom-
plished by the morning of February 6th, after troops ran into a 
heavy fire from automatic and small arms. The area was also under 
enemy observation and U. S. troops had to be supplied at night. 
The Nazis continued to be very active in the Hellenthal area with 
patrols constantly probing Division lines. It was during this period 
that First Lt. Charles D. Curley, Richmond, Virginia, of "L" Company, 
38th Infantry, picked up conversation on his SCR 536 radio from a 
German patrol. Using Pfc. Solomon C. Fink of Elgin, North Dakota 
as an interpreter, he succeeded in placing mortar fire on an enemy 
group trying to probe our lines. The last message heard was simple 
and terse: "Those bastard Americans are shelling the road, we can't 
get any nearer; there are casualties." 
To the North, the Ninth and First Armies succeeded in forcing 
a crossing of the Roer River. The Division on February 17th side-
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stepped to the North, assuming control of a portion of the 9th In-
fantry Division's sector, with the mission of controlling a s~ctor south 
of the Urft Reservoir, uppermost of the system of Roer and Urft 
River dams. 
Task Force "S", consisting of the 38th Infantry, the Third 
Battalion of the 9th Infantry, 38th .Field Artillery Battalion, Company 
"B" of the 7 41st Tank Battalion, Companies "B" and "C" of the 86th 
Chemical Battalion, Company "C" of the 2nd Engineer Battalion, and 
Company "C" of the 2nd Medical Battalion, became operational on 
March 1st. On March 3rd it moved North through the III Corps sector, 
crossed into the bridgehead at Heimbach, and attacked South through 
·the 78th Infantry Division, advancing approximately 4500 yards 
through heavily mined areas and scattered fire. The First and Second 
Battalions of the 38th Infantry cleared out pillboxes on the Western 
edge of Gemund and on the high ground to the Northeast of Gemund, 
and the Third Battalion, 9th Infantry, occupied the town on March 
4th. Gemund was a bastion in the final belt of Siegfried Line fortifi-
cations and thus, after five long months, the 2nd Division had burst 
through the formidable West Wall and was entering upon an entirely 
new phase of the war. 
By March 6 an enemy withdrawal was definitely indicated, and 
the Second advanced rapidly to the Southeast, taking many towns and 
villages incll!ding Mechernich, without any show of resistance. 
The First Battalion, 9th Infantry, met a delaying force late in the 
day as it approached Weyer from the West, and at the same time the 
Second Battalion, 23rd Infantry encountered another force Northwest 
of N ethen which was quickly overrun. By the close of the day no 
enemy resistance was reported on the entire Division front. Of the 
43 PW's processed at the Division cage during the period, 35 different 
units were represented. As the Division closed on the Rhine River at 
Rheineck, delaying forces in moderate strength, employing all avail-
able weapons, tried to delay the Division's advance, but to no avail. 
On March 11th all organized resistance in the Division zone West of 
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the Rhine River was 
cleared. 
Reports of enemy 
material captured dur-
ing the period Ma:r:ch 
6-11 indica ted the 
haste of the enemy 
withdrawal. Several 
houses full of ammuni-
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tion were seized in Frohnau and Buir, and 22 carloads in a 
tunnel along the railroad west of Schuld. Guns of all calibers, a motor 
park of some 17 vehicles, and a map depot formerly belonging to the 
Fifth Panzer Army were found along the route of advance. 
The Division then was ordered to assume a defensive position 
along the West Bank of the Rhine to protect the Remagen bridge-
head against water-borne attack. On the night of March 19th the 9th 
Infantry Regiments Second Battalion made a night landing attack on 
the Rhine island opposite Hammerstein, and eliminated a small pocket 
of resistance that had continued to hold out. 
* CHAPTER VI 
Victory Ahead 
On March 21, the Division crossed the Rhine in the Southern 
sector of the Remagen Bridgehead to re-enter an area where the 
Indianhead patch was no stranger. Just 26 years before, in December, 
1919, the Second had spanned the river in the same section and spent 
eight months as part of the Army of Occupation. Even after two and 
a half decades, traces and memories of the men from the last war 
were still prevalent. 
On several occasions, surprised German civilians ran into the 
streets, pointing at the patches and jabbering away that they re-
membered them from many years back. The Second Quartermaster 
Company set up its CP in a building in Heimbach and discovered the 
Division's 15th Field Artillery had had its CP in the same building in 
1919. Pictures of the 15th's band and other members of the unit, their 
patches plainly visible, turned up in the quarters, and Heimbach's 
burgomeister brought in a mouldy Second Division jacket from World 
War I. 
Ninth Regiment troops uncovered other photographs, one show-
ing a Second Division soldier standing on the East bank of the Rhine, 
with Castle Rheineck, which the 9th captured in this war, in the back-
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ground. To Colonel 
Hirschfelder, who com-
manded the 9th 
throughout most of its 
fighting in Europe, th•:') 
Rhineland a r oused 
strong memories. He 
was the only officer in 
the Division during its 
occupation duty who 
had r eturned with the 
unit. 
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The 38th captured the towns of Segendorf and Rodenbach, where 
the 18th company of the Fifth Marine Regiment, part of the Division 
in the last war, was billeted. In a building in which the 38th set up a 
CP in Rodenbach, a booklet containing pictures and a history of the 
18th Marine company was found. 
At Gonnersdorf, Herman Krohn, formerly of Milwaukee, who was 
in E Battery of the Division's 15th Field Artillery in the last war, was 
discovered living with the woman he returned to Germany to marry in 
1920. After serving in the Army of Occupation, he obtained his dis-
charge at Fort Slocum, New York, and then sailed for Germany. Now 
white-haired and 59, he said he had his fill of the country and wanted 
to take his wife and two sons back to the United States "as soon as 
possible." 
Other old photographs and a 1919 edition of Stars and Stripes 
gave further evidence that the Germans either found it hard to 
obliterate traces of the Division or had not desired to do so. 
But the Division in this war was not merely occupying the area. 
It had the important job of broadening the bridgehead and cutting a 
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Here we go again. 
hole for armor to start 
its Eastward push. 
What was learned of 
the Second's occupa-
tion in World War I 
had to be gathered on 
the run. In the month 
ahead, the Division 
was to travel close to 
400 miles to the very 
heart of Germany, 
take 19,000 prisoners 
and liberate slave 
workers and prisoners by the thousands. All phases of Germany -
murder institutions, concentration camps, Gestapo and SS head-
quarters, and the tremendous war plants that had kept the Nazi war 
machine operating- were to be uncovered. 
The Division had relieved the 394th Regiment on reaching the 
Eastern bank of the Rhine and set up its Division CP at Honningen. d 
Then it attacked Southward for five days, taking some 20 towns and 0 
encountering emergency units who opposed the advance with v 
machine gun, rifle and moderate artillery fire. Following the oc- 1 
cupancy of Baumbach, the Ninth Armored Division, with the 38th 
Infantry attached, passed through and from then until the end of the 
month the Second followed it in a wide encircling move which helped 
create the Ruhr pocket on April 1. 
Tactical elements of the Division engaged in mopping up by-
passed enemy groups and combing the woods and isolated villages. 
Prisoners rounded up during this period averaged some 200 a day, 
many of them stragglers in the rear areas. 
At Hadamar, where the Division located its CP on March 29, 
military government and intelligence officers discovered a murder 
institution equalling in horror anything ever written by Poe. Germans 
themselves estimated that since 1941 at least 20,000 political pris-
oners, Jews and slave laborers had been put to death. The prisoners, 
too weak to work and no longer of value to the Nazis, were 
starved to the point of death and then killed by a hypodermic in-
jection. Captain Brinkley Hamilton, attached to the Division's Mili-
tary Government team, led the investigation, and said that in his 10 
years of experience with the London police force he had never seen 
anything to equal the methodical cruelty of the plant. Killing of the 
10,000th person, officers were told, was celebrated by a party at which 
guests drank from one of the victim's skulls. 
It was during these days also that the Division began to run 
into the first hordes of liberated slave workers and prisoners. Thou-
sands streamed down the 'toads, waving, smiling, and pushing their 
belongings on carts or carrying them. The non-fraternization rule · t. 
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did not pern;,it ·~ssociation with these tired and ragged people, many 
of whom had been. dragged into Germany five years ago, but there 
were few doughboys who did not slip them something fro'm their 
ration boxes from time to time. 
PW cages were bursting with prisoners collected in droves. Many 
gave up voluntarily when they saw the fight was over and their lives 
no longer in danger. Others changed to civilian clothes and had to 
be ferreted out of their hiding places. In Romberg, an advance detail 
of 11 signalmen entered a day after armor had passed through and 
rounded up 50 prisoners. A short while later the Division CP was 
established there. In another case, a woman went to the Military 
Interrogation Intelligence Office and said her husband, a former 
soldier dressed in civilian clothes, had tried to surrender several times, 
but guards could not understand him and he was waved away. Her 
request for help in the matter was met. · 
Americans were being liberated also, but some of their stories 
were sorry to hear. The Ninth Regiment found 25 emaciated, starved 
U. S. soldiers who had escaped from their German captors and met the 
Division in Braunfels. One man had lost 30 pounds under the starva-
tion diet and beatings were frequent. At least three Americans 
suffocated, they reported, when they spent four days in freight cars, 
packed like matches. 
The 38th Regiment liberated 47 Allied prisoners near Limburg 
and among them acting First Sgt. William E. Woolen of San Antonio, 
Texas, Headquarters Company, found T j Sgt. Sim Cartwright, Nash-
ville, Tennessee, whom he had not seen since they served together 
in the Pacific nearly 10 years before. Cartwright, captured while in 
the 78th Division during the breakthrough, had lost 20 pounds on a 
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Two down, one to go. 
bread and water diet 
during one period of 
his imprisonment. 
At the turn of the 
month, the 38th's Anti 
Tank Company had 
one of the roughest 
battles of its career, 
battling some 800 SS 
troops and 15 tanks in a raging seven-hour struggle in the town of 
Bonenburg. Trapped in a pocket, the SS troops had to come through 
the town held by the company to escape. When it was over and the 
Americans had held firm until tanks and armored infantry relieved 
them, more than 200 SS men, clad in sleek black uniforms, were dead, 
three truck loads wounded and 40 taken prisoner. 
In the first feint, the company's nine 57 mm guns successfully 
met the tank thrust, knocking out two tanks and one halftrack. Two 
of the guns were silenced, however. First Lt. Joe E Steakley, Abilene, 
Texas, who had recently assumed command of the company, felt it was 
just the beginning and regrouped his forces. More than 12 hours later, 
the vaunted SS men, each armed with a machine pistol and many 
with machine guns and panzerfausts also, struck again. Accompanied 
by 15 tanks, they swept into the town in a blaze of fire. So close was 
the fighting that at times SS troops occupied the ground floor of 
houses and doughboys the top. Despite the grave peril it placed them 
in, the Americans called for artillery fire on their own positions to help 
halt the Nazis. For six 
hours the savage 
fighting continued. 
Then U. S. tanks and 
armored infantry 
arrived to help the gal-
lant c o m p an y still 
holding firm. It s 
casualties: Four dead, 
20 wounded, thre 8 
missing in action. 
Ack ack alley at Leipzig. 
• 
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On April 1, the jaws of the Ruhr trap ·snapped shut on some 
340,000 encircled Germans and the Division swung East again. Since 
leaving the Rhine, it had made six moves, established command posts 
at Honningen, Niederbieder, Hohr Grenshausen, Hadamar, Romberg 
and Sachenhausen. Now the reduction of the pocket was to be taken 
care of by other units and the Second struck out in coordination with 
the Ninth Armored Division, sometimes mopping up, sometimes 
swinging out in front to crush tough obstacles. 
At the outskirts to Hofgeismar, it became apparent that the 
town was to be stubbornly defended and a heavy artillery barrage was 
laid down. It proved a rather curious obstacle. After being softened 
up by artillery, it was encircled and tanks pushed through, spraying 
machine gun fire. They found a defensive force composed for the 
most part of wild-eyed youths from 15 to 18 years old, a majority of 
whom had been receiving SS training. The greater percentage fought 
courageously in foxholes and buildings, but there were some who had 
been taken from their homes in Hofgeismar only several days before. 
One told how they gave him a Czechoslovakian rifle, but never a 
chance to learn to fire it. Terrified when the tanks and machine guns 
opened up, he buried his nose in the corner of a foxhole and waited 
for death or capture. 
Bridging the Weser River at Veckerhagen, the Second swept 
toward one of its richest prizes, the famous old univer~ity center of 
Gottingen. It was taken by the 23rd Regiment with the firing of only 
a few shots and yielded 23 hospitals with 2,500 German patients, four 
Nazi generals and an airfield that was the best captured in Germany 
at that date. Fifty German planes, valuable instruments and repair 
shops and two American aircraft were found at the field. It was 
believed the U. S. ships either had been used in actual combat against 
American forces or were being tested to learn their capabilities. 
Retreating Nazis apparently left in a hurry as a single plowed furrow 
was the only damage to the field. 
At a prison camp at Duderstadt, 700 Allied soldiers came into 
U. S. hands on April 9th following months of mistreatment, severe 
marches, beatings and miserable diets. Fifty of the men were 
Americans. 
A medley of troops had been opposing the advance so far. Tanks 
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Assault across the Weser. 
made their appearance 
from time to time and 
the once-powerful 
Luftwaffe e v e n oc-
casionally ventured out 
to strafe. Generally, 
the defense was scat-
tered with spells of 
sharp fighting. Local 
reserves, Volkssturm 
members and miscel-
laneous groups came 
through PW channels 
and one group had been in a battalion of men suffering from stomach 
ulcers. They poured in like a mountain brook, with the daily total 
generally running over 1,000. Every truck that could be spared was 
used to rush them to the rear. This was positive evidence that the 
final disintergration of the German war machine was at hand. Troops 
looked to the East where the Russians were driving and wondered if 
the joining of the two forces would bring V-E. It was a period also in 
which almost every doughboy got himself a German pistol. Sending 
of souvenirs home began to put a strain on mail facilities of the 
Division. 
Several tons of documents, believed to be the entire SS Surgeon 
General file, were located in Bad Frankenhausen where the Division 
set up a command post. Many books, bearing Rimmler's own signa-
ture, were picked up along with a card index file to what appeared to 
be the dossiers of all party members. 
While there was only scattered fighting in the hurried push from 
the Rhine, the Second Quartermaster Company was tackling its 
greatest problem. It had a four-fold job. Tremendous quantities of 
gasoline had to be hauled to keep alive the hundreds of vehicles in the 
division, and thousands of prisoners had to be transported to the rear. 
Then in addition to moving its own large organization on each new 
advance, the trucks had to carry forward Infantry troops and the 
Division's Headquarters. It was a job that left little time for any-. 
thing but work, and that's about all that was done. Truck drivers 
went for days at times with just a few hours of sleep and hurried 
meals of cold rations. Often supply dumps were moved just behind 
spearheading armor in order that the Second, when it came through 
mopping up, would find its stores ready. Some drivers covered 400 
miles in a single day, and as much as 40,000 gallons of gasoline were 
brought forward. Prisoners in tremendous numbers had to be sent to 
the rear. 
In the Leuna-Merseburg area, the wearers of the Indianhead 
patch ran into one of the heaviest concentrations of ack-ack guns in 
Europe, and the hardest fighting they had encountered since crossing 
36 
the 
fur 
thi; 
tro 
he: 
Fr: 
Le 
Al 
nu 
so 
ar 
pi 
m 
tl 
a1 
v 
ll 
VI 
v 
I 
] 
ser. 
1ce 
nd 
'ul 
>C-
Ut 
ly, 
~t­
of 
al 
m 
.J-
le 
ls 
h 
il 
s 
the Rhine. For the entire 14-mile stretch into Leipzig, they received 
furious artillery blasts from some 1,000 pieces that formerly protected 
this vital industrial area, but were now slashing at advancing ground 
troops with tremendous barrages. Many veterans said it was the 
heaviest artillery fire thrown at them since they came ashore in 
France 11 months before. 
The Ninth Armored Division had turned South to by-pass 
Leipzig, leaving the Second the task of driving through the flak belt. 
Augmenting the 88 mm to 128 mm flak guns in each battery were 
numerous lighter caliber pieces, particularly multiple 20 mm guns. In 
some cases super batteries had been formed of three ordinary batteries 
and as many as 40 guns were emplaced at one location, generally in 
pits of brick with dirt piled around to a thickness of 30 feet. Com-
munications trenches added to the picture . 
At the approach of hostile ground forces, the Germans utilized 
the flak positions as strong points, sending direct fire hurtling at 
armor moving across the flat terrain and air bursts at infantry. 
When the troops drew close to the positions, the gunners fought as 
infantry from the trenches, at times with fanatical zeal. Often it 
was necessary to blast them out with grenades. 
Merseburg, near where Germany's largest synthetic rubber plant 
was located, and Leuna, chief synthetic gasoline producer for the 
Reich, both were taken on April 15. Long a top priority bomb target, 
Leuna was a shamble of iron and steel when Ninth Regiment troops 
pushed into the tremendous plant. A year before it had been making 
10,843,373 gallons of gasoline a month, but repeated air missions. had 
cut the output to 1,446,975 gallons and it finally folded up in March. 
A subsidiary of I. G. Farben, it produced the vile-smelling gasoline 
from coal and coke and employed 28,000 persons, about 10,000 being 
slave workers. Nitrogen and coal alcohol also were turned out in 
smaller quantities. 
Merseburg was stubbornly defended by 2,000 Volkssturm members, 
supplemented by Luftwaffe and labor troops, who used small arms, 
machine guns, ack-ack 
and panzerfaust fire 
to good advantage. It 
also marked the first 
time the Volkssturm 
had put up any form 
of an organized 
struggle against the 
Division. One battalion 
of the 23rd Regiment, 
which took the town, 
was cut off inside the 
city when heavy con-
The last round-up at 
Leipzig. 
37 
centrations of ack-ack fire knocked out tanks and jeeps coming in 
behind for support. With murderous ack-ack fire falling on the 
battalion, U. S. Aid men and a German nurse and driver made a series 
of mad dashes to a Nazi hospital on the opposite side of town to carry 
out wounded. Following an all-night struggle, the town finally was 
cleared and 1,000 Volkssturm members taken prisoner. It also yielded 
an airfield and a number of planes. 
A large percentage of prisoners taken during this time were from 
the countless ack-ack batteries and a few were on the balmy side. 
One, ordered to stand at attention, burst into gales of laughter. 
Another, asked for his Soldier's book, leaped into the air and jitter-
bugged off to hide behind a trailer. 
Many German Wacs were among the prisoners also. Some had 
been members of trial flak batteries to determine if women could be 
used successfully in this type of work. On April 7, aircraft in raiding 
the Leuna works dropped a bomb wide of the target and hit the trial 
battery, blowing off 'legs and arms and causing hysteria among the 
Wacs. Prisoners who told the story said the high command con-
cluded the experiment had not been a success and relieved the women. 
Most of the battle for Leipzig was fought in the flak belt out-
side the city. Once that was pierced, the intense artillery concen-
trations dropped off and the going was much easier. The Second's 
part was to advance to the Weisse-Elster Canal, which separates West 
Leipzig- almost a third of the city- from the other portions. It 
was also to seize any bridges it found intact. The 69th Divis1on had 
the mission of entering from the South and occupying the city. 
The 23rd Regiment, followed closely by the 38th, was the first 
American unit to enter the city. Anti-tank, panzerfaust and intense 
small arms fire was thrown at U.S. tanks and infantry as they neared 
the canal, but they managed to push across on April 18 and secure 
three bridges found intact. 
In its first attempt to cross the Zepplin Bridge, the lead platoon 
of the 23rd Regiment met an intense barrage of machine gun and 
small arms fire and after sustaining numerous casualties was forced 
to pull back off the span. SjSgt. Ernest L. Barber, of Tionesta, Penn-
sylvania, who was serving as lead scout, continued on across alone, 
however, and killed two Germans in hand to hand combat. In the 
action despite heavy U. S. artillery and mortar fire falling on this 
side of the canal, Barber began a one-man rampage, capturing five 
enemy and assaulting and killing the crews of two machine gun posi-
tions. The grinning doughboy, who then returned to the bridge and 
gave valuable information to his company coming back across, was 
credited with killing at least 11 Germans and covering 400 yards in hjs 
heroic sortie. . 
Fifth Corps had given orders for the division to continue into the 
city, but shortly afterward the command was to hold up and allow the 
69th Division to come North and effect a meeting. This was done 
and the city fell the next day. 
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In addition to its other values, Leipzig enabled the Division's 
702 Ordnance Company to resume its practice of getting essential 
materials from civilian sources when the Army was unable to supply 
them quickly. Guns and trucks were rusting for lack of OD paint so 
500 gallons were obtained in Leipzig. Bushings to keep the trucks 
running were also located. Ever since the Second had taken up 
positions along the German border and the wear and tear of war had 
begun to impair the efficiency of equipment, First Lt. Robert W. 
O'Banion, Ordnance Supply Officer from Houston, Texas, had been 
buying and requisitioning from civilian factories in Belgium and 
Germany. 
Leipzig in U. S. hands, the Second moved swiftly to the Mulde 
River to take up a defensive position and await a possible link-up with 
the Russians. Scores of anxious war correspondents roamed the 
Division for days after its artillery observation planes spotted Red 
columns moving up from the East. The linkup, which occurred at 
Torgau, was further North and out of the Division's sector, however. 
Hundreds of Germans, caught between the two Allied forces, 
sought to cross the Mulde into U. S. lines during this time. Many had 
fled before the American advance, but now chose the U. S. as the 
lesser of two evils and wanted to return. But the policy was firm: 
German soldiers could come over into PW cages, the others must stay 
where they were. 
There was every indication during the Division's stay in the Mulde 
River defensive positions that it had fought its last campaign against 
the Germans and was to sit tight until the fast-collapsing Nazis 
called it quits. But, as it so often happens for the doughboys, there 
was one more job to be completed. The Division was transferred from 
the First to the Third Army and a swift motor trip carried it 200 
miles South to an area along the Czechoslovakian border. The collapse 
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of the German war machine then was in its final stages and in the 
Division's seven-day campaign in Czechoslovakia, the job mainly was 
one of clearing towns of German remnants and taking masses of 
prisoners. May 6 was a :Red Letter Day in this latter respect with 
8,000 giving up. This was the largest number of prisoners captured 
in a single day by the Second. 
V-E and the wildly enthusiastic ovation given the Division by the 
happy Czechs made a tremendous climax for the war in Europe. In the 
Czech border towns, with heavy German populations, there had been 
little cheering. But on the approaches to Pilsen and in the city itself, 
the Czechs lined the roads and streets in a demonstration of gratitude 
t hat correspondents said was even greater than that of Paris. 
The 16th Armored Division had taken the city and when the 
Second arrived soon afterward, the local populace was just beginning 
to realize the wonderful news that for the first time since 1939 they 
were free. This was one day before V-E, but it was the beginning of 
the carnival spirit that seized the Czechs and Americans alike and con-
tinued for days. Each of the white-starred American vehicles received 
.a separate greeting as the Division rolled into the city. The crowds 
packing the sidewalks increased as the day wore on and as the last 
troops arrived at nightfall, the enthusiasm was probably at its highest 
pitch. Pilsen's mayor, just released from a concentration camp and 
given his job back, brought the traditional Czechoslovakian welcome 
of bread and salt to General Robertson and some of the country's 
finest musicians, allowed to play only certain compositions under the 
Nazi Regime, held a concert for the American commander. 
The official V-E announcement the next day brought further 
celebration and entertainment by the Czechs in honor of their 
Liberators. Dances and parties also were held by the Division, but the 
question in most of the doughboys' minds was whether this marked 
the war's end for them or whether they would have to begin another 
-campaign in the Pacific. This tempered news of the war's end and 
although there was happiness and satisfaction, there was no wild 
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elation. For the civilians of Pilsen, the war was over, but for the 
Americans it was a different story. 
The Division had spent 320 days in combat since coming ashore 
on D plus one, June 7, 1944. It remained in line 71 straight days in 
Normandy. And after taking over positions in Germany on October 4, 
it was committed continuously for 217 days until the end of the war. 
The troops were tired and weary of war and new countries. But 
although two enemies had been defeated, they knew that one still 
remained. 
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INDIANHEAD ROLL CALL 
Commanding General ... ..... ............ Major General Walter M. Robertson 
Division Artillery Commanding General- Brigadier General George P . Hays, 
Commanding July 1, 1942 to November 14, 1944. 
Brigadier General John H. Hinds, Commanding since November 14, 1944. 
Assistant Division Commander .......... Brigadier General John H. Stokes, Jr. 
Chief of Division Staff ......... ..... .............. Colonel Ralph W. Zwicker 
INFANTRY REGIMENTS 
9th Infantry Regiment - Colonel Chester J. Hirschfelder, commanding June 
10, 1942 to January 10, 1945. 
Colonel P . D. Ginder, commanding since January 10, 1945. 
23rd Infantry Regiment ................................ Colonel J. B. Lovless 
38th Infantry Regiment .............................. Colonel Francis H. Boos 
ARTILLERY BATTALIONS 
12th Field Artillery Battalion ....... . ............... Lt. Col. Alvan M. Muldrow 
15th Field Artillery Battalion ....................... Lt. Col. Robert C. Cassibry 
37th Field Artillery Battalion- Lt. Col. Tobias C. Eastman, to April 26, 1945. 
Major Earl Hurt, since April 26, 1945. 
38th Field Artillery Battalion . . ... . ... . ............... Lt. Col. Donald C. Little 
SPECIAL UNITS 
2nd Engineer Battalion - Lt. Col. Robert B. Warren, to January 17, 1945 
Lt. Col. Robert E. Snetzer, since January 17, 1945. 
2nd Medical Battalion .................................. Lt. Col Cecil F. J orns 
SPECIAL TROOPS 
Headquarters Commandant ......................... Lt. Col. Matt F. C. Konop 
Headquarters Company .......................... Captain Frederick A. Palmer 
2nd Signal Company .................................. Captain Keith IE. Hall 
2nd Reconnaissance Troop ....... .. . .. .... .......... Captain General P. Hefley 
2nd Quartermaster Company ................ Captain Raymond A. Brimmer, Jr. 
702nd Ordnance (LM) Company ........................ Captain Otto H. Allen 
Military Police Platoon . .............. . .... . ... . .. .... Major William F. North 
ATTACHED UNITS 
7 41st Tank Battalion . ...... .. .............. .... . . . . Lt. Col Robert W. Skaggs 
462nd AAA Battalion . .. ..... . ....... .... ....... .... Lt. Col. Norman R. Stultz 
612th Tank Destroyer Battalion .... .. .. .. . . ...... ... Lt. Col. Joseph M. Deeley 
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HEADQUARTERS VIII CORPS 
Office of the Commanding General 
APO 308, U. S. Army. 
Major General Walter M. Robertson, U. S. Army, 
Commanding General, 2nd Infantr.)'. Division, 
APO 2, U. S. Army. 
My dear General Robertson: 
Belgium, 
ll December 1944. 
On the eve of the relief of the 2nd Infantry Division from 
the VIII Corps, for important duty elsewhere, I desire to take this 
opportunity and this means to express to Jou, your officers, and your 
·enlisted men my appreciation for the excellent service rendered while 
in this comn:and. 
The 2nd Division was assigned to the VIII Corps .late in 
August, 1944, for the special mi~sion of reducing t~e important enemy 
stronghold at Brest, France. Subsequently, the division moved east 
with the Corps and has occupied a defensive sector along the German 
border north of Luxembourg. The superior manner in which the division 
conducted itself at Brest is known to all and is now histroy. Since 
leaving Brest, the division has cont inued to perform its work in a 
most satisf.)ing manner. 
In departing the VIII Corps, we shall miss the cheerful 
attitude, excellent spirit of cooperation, and willingness and ability 
to do the job, so evident in the 2nd Division. We shall watch with 
interest the future actions of the Division. We feel confident that it 
will alwa.)'s acquit its~lf in a superior manner. 
If the opportunity permits, please express my thanks and 
.appreciation to the officers and men of .)Our division for their excel-
lent work since joinging the Corps. To you personally, I thank sin-
cerel.)' for your spirit of cooperation ana the able manner in which 
~ou have ·led the division. 
Sincerely yours·, 
/s/ Troy H. Middleton 
/t / TROy H. MIDDLETON, 
Maj o.r General, U. S. Army, 
Commanding. 
AG 201.22 1st Ind. (11 Dec 44) 
HEADQUART ERS 2D' INFANTRy DIVI ~ IO~, APO 2, U. S. Army, 17 December 1944. 
·TO: All Officers and Enlisted men of the Division. 
It is a great pleasure to transmit to the officers and men of 
the 2d Infantr~ Division this well deserved commendation. I wish to 
add ffij own appreciati on for the courage, stamina and fortitude which 
has carried .)OU forward from vi~tory to victor.)• With just pride in 
another job well done, I again salute jOU. 
4-1 
W. M. ROBERTSON, 
Major General, U. S. Army, 
Commanding. 
11EAJ:QUARTERS V CORPS 
United States Army 
Office of the Commanding General 
1 Jenuary 1945 
l~y dear Robertson: 
I wi~~ to expre s s to you and the members of your command my 
appreciation and co!'llllendation for the fine job you did in preventing the 
enemy from carrying out his Plano to break through the V CorP• sector and push 
on to the Meuse River. Not only did your command assist in effectively 
frustrating that particular part of the plan ,. but it also inflicted such heavy 
los•es on the enE>IDY that he lias unnble to carry out other conte!11Plated mission& 
in other sectors of the Allied front. 
General Von Manteuffel, Commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, stated 
in the address to his troops prior to the attack that "Our ground mission must 
be continuous: o the,..·is e we will not echieve our goal". Due, in p art, to the 
?nd Infantry Divi•ion, thia ground mission has not been continuous, an~ he 
will not achieve his goal. 
My eincere thanks for all that you have done for the Allied cause 
during 1944, and best viahee for even greater and more deci sive successes 
during 1945. 
Commanding General, 
2nd Infantry D1 vision, 
,\PO 2, United States Army. 
Sincerely, 
I •I Gerov 
ltl L, T, GEROW, 
Major General, u. s. Army, 
Commanding. 
HEADQUARTERS V CORPS 
APO 305 
Office of the Commanding General 
SUBJECT: Commendation. 
7 March 1945 
TO : Commanding General, 2d Infantr,y Division, APO 2, U. S. Army. 
1. On 13 December 1944, while the 2d Infantry Division was 
in the midst of an offensive operation aimed toward the capture of 
Dam No. 5 on the Urft River, the now historic German counteroffensive 
struck a formidable blow on the V Corps f1·ont. To the northwest in 
the Monschau area, heavJ enem~ attacks were received on 16 December, 
and to the south the 99th Infantr,y Division was attacked by power-
ful armored and infantr~ forces. Serious penetrations were made in 
the 99th Infantry Division sector in the Krinkelt-Bullingen-Eutgenbach 
area. It became necessary to suspend your attack and to intersperse 
2d Inf'antry Division units with elements of the 99th Infantry Division 
along the general line - Rocherath-Krinkelt-Wirt~feld-Butgenbach. 
2. Due to the rapid mo~ement of 2d Infantry Division units 
into the line and stubborn and courageous fighting on .,he part of 
all troops engaged, the Elsenborn hinge of the Corps front, "Purple 
Heart Corner", was held against a series of furious enemy assaults. 
This spirit of ~ourageous defense was demonstrated all along the 
line and the desperate enemy efforts to break through and sei~e con-
trol of the Elsenborn plateau and the i mportant roa·d net extending 
to the north and northeast were frustrated. 
3. Following the defeat of the German counteroffensive in 
the Ardennes Salient, the 2d Infantry Division resumed the offensive 
on 30 Januar> 1945, retaking the towns of Wirt"feld, Krinkelt and 
Rocherath and generally restoring the line as it existed prior to 
16 December 1944. The attack was continued su~cessfully, resulting 
in the capture of Harperscheid, Ettelscheid, Bronsfeld, Hellenthal, 
Scheuren and the high ground along the west bank of the Urft River 
overlooking Schleiden. The operations of the 2d Infantry Division 
-during this period contributed greatly to the success of V Corps in 
capturing the series of dams on the Roer and Urft Rivers. 
4. During these actions, the 2d Infantr~ Division inflicted 
upon the enemy heavy losses in personnel and equipment. The magnif-
ic ent defensi ·, e stand, at "Purple Heart Corner", blunting the fury 
of the hostile attack and protecting the critical Eupen-•almedy road, 
cal'..not be praised too highlv. 
5. My personal thanks and appreciation to the 2d Infantr~ 
Division for its noteworthy and commendable achievements during 
the period 12 December 1944 - 12 Februar,y 1945. 
C. R. HUEBNER, 
Major General, U. S. Arm~, 
Commanding. 
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''1 KNEW 50M£; SOME I SAW; PART OF IT I WAS. 11 
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